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Abstract
Morelli (American Political Science Review, 1999) provides a ma-
joritarian bargaining model in which the parties make payoﬀ demands
and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli’s main
proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoﬀsi n s i d et h e
coalition that forms is proportional to the homogeneous representa-
tion of the game. We provide a counterexample and prove a weaker
result: proportional payoﬀs hold if the rules are modiﬁed so that the
parties must move in decreasing order of weight.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a parliamentary democracy, many important decisions including govern-
ment formation are the outcome of bargaining between the parties in Parlia-
ment. The most inﬂuential model of legislative bargaining is the closed rule
model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In this model, a party is randomly
recognized to propose a complete distribution of ministerial payoﬀsa n dt h e
remaining parties can accept or reject the proposal. This model has led
to many applications and extensions.1 It has some properties that may be
perceived as drawbacks: the proposer has a large advantage2 (he receives
more than half of the total payoﬀ under simple majority), and there is a
multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. In order to single out a unique
prediction, the stationary equilibrium is selected. Stationary strategies are
simple but by no means uncontroversial: a stationary strategy requires a
party to always make the same proposal regardless of the history of the ne-
gotiations so far. Moreover, Norman (2002) shows that sharp predictions
using stationarity are only possible in the inﬁnite horizon version of the
model: in the ﬁnite horizon version there is a continuum of equilibria, all of
them with history-independent strategies.
An alternative model of legislative bargaining by Morelli (1999) is based
not on complete proposals but on demands. Parties make individual de-
mands for ministerial payoﬀs and a coalition emerges between parties mak-
ing compatible demands. The Head of State chooses the ﬁrst mover, and the
latter chooses the order in which the parties formulate demands. Morelli’s
1For example, McKelvey and Riezman (1992) analize seniority in legislatures. Other
papers incorporate policy preferences (see e.g. Baron, 1991; Jackson and Moselle, 2002),
diﬀerent risk attitudes or discount factors (Harrington 1990, Eraslan 2002), diﬀerent vot-
ing rules (Winter 1996, Snyder et al. 2005, Montero 2006) or arbitrary recognition prob-
abilities (Kalandrakis, 2006). Banks and Duggan (2000) show existence of stationary
equilibrium under very general conditions.
2This feature is also present in other proposal-making models (Austen-Smith and Banks
(1988), Bloch and Rottier (2002)).
2main result (Proposition 2) is that the ex post distribution of payoﬀsi n s i d e
the coalition that forms is proportional to the homogeneous representation
of the game regardless of which party is chosen to be the ﬁrst mover. This
is an attractive result in at least two respects: the ﬁrst mover has no dispro-
portionate advantage, and a sharp result can be obtained without resorting
to controversial equilibrium reﬁnements.3
In this paper we provide a counterexample to Morelli’s Proposition 2.
In our counterexample, the ﬁr s tm o v e r ,e v e ni fi ti st h es m a l l e s tp a r t yi n
parliament, can exploit the competition between the other parties and cap-
ture the entire surplus if it is allowed to choose the order of moves. We then
go on to prove a weaker result: proportional payoﬀs hold if the rules are
modiﬁed so that the parties must move in decreasing order of weight. This
procedure mirrors the assumption of Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) that
parties are asked to try to form a government in decreasing order of weight.
Parties making demands in decreasing order of weight is not a completely
unnatural assumption. In some countries the largest party must be asked
to form the government ﬁrst; in the absence of this rule the largest party is
still selected quite often.4 Moving ﬁrst in the demand bargaining procedure
is not equivalent to being formateur (the rules of the game allow other par-
3The empirical evidence lies somewhere in between. A large body of empirical studies
(see e.g. Browne and Franklin 1973, Schoﬁeld and Laver 1985, Warwick and Druckman
2001) ﬁnd little or no advantage to being formateur: a party’s share of cabinet posts is
nearly proportional to its share of legislative seats in the governing coalition. Ansolabehere
et al. (2005) ﬁnd a formateur advantage using voting weights instead of seat shares,
though this advantage is well below the value predicted by the Baron-Ferejohn model.
Interestingly, experiments on majority games do not ﬁnd as sharp a behavioral diﬀerence
between both types of procedures as the theory predicts (see Fréchette et al., 2005).
4The Greek constitution prescribes that the leader of the largest party must be chosen
as the ﬁrst formateur; if he fails, the leader of the second largest party is selected, to be
followed by the leader of the third largest party if he too fails. Even if the constitution is
silent on this matter, a convention may emerge (Laver and Schoﬁeld, 1990, p. 210). For
a quantitative analysis of formateur selection see table 1 in Warwick (1996), table 3 in
Diermeier and Merlo (2004), and table 3 in Ansolabehere et al. (2005).
3ties to exclude the largest party), though in equilibrium the largest party is
always included in the government.
There have been other demand bargaining models in the literature. Bin-
more (1985) presents a three-player “market model” where demands are
carried over to the next round and inﬁnite plays are possible. Selten (1992)
presents a general but relatively complicated model, including random draws
and costs of both formulating a demand and forming a coalition. Bennett
and van Damme (1991) study a simpler version in which each player selects
the next one to move, and show that there may be a multiplicity of subgame
perfect equilibria. Using a reﬁnement, they select the proportional payoﬀ
division for apex games. Winter (1994), Dasgupta and Chiu (1998), and
Vidal-Puga (2004) use various demand commitment procedures to imple-
ment the Shapley value in convex games.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Weighted majority games
Consider a legislature in which n parties are represented. We denote these as
N = {1,2,...,n}. There is a budget of size 1 to be divided by majority rule.
Each party i has ωi votes, and a quota of q is needed for a majority. The
pair [q;(wi)i∈N] is a weighted majority game. Notice that the game is not
aﬀected if weights and quota are multiplied by the same positive constant.
Given a vector x ∈ RN and a coalition S ⊂ N,w ed e n o t ea sxS the sum




A coalition S ⊂ N is winning if ωS ≥ q;i ti sminimal winning if it
is winning and no T Ã S is winning. We denote as Ω(ω) the set of all
winning coalitions, and as Ωm (ω) the set of all minimal winning coalitions.
A dummy player is a player who does not belong to any minimal winning
coalition.
A weighted majority game is constant-sum if S ∈ Ω(ω) ⇐⇒ N\S/ ∈
4Ω(ω) for all S. It admits an equivalent homogeneous representation if there











S ⊂ N : ωh
S = qhª
.Aw e i g h t e dm a j o r i t yg a m et h a ta d m i t sa n
equivalent homogeneous representation is called a homogeneous game.
Homogeneous representations do not always exist and when they exist
they may not be unique. For example, [5;3,2,2,1] and [7;4,3,3,1] are two
homogeneous representations of the same game. Peleg (1968) shows that
constant-sum homogeneous games have a unique homogeneous representa-
tion (up to multiplication by a positive constant and to the weight that is
assigned to dummies, which may be 0 or a suﬃciently small number).
2.2 Morelli’s bargaining procedure
There are n parties, 1 unit of private beneﬁts to be distributed between
them, and a policy to be chosen from the one-dimensional policy space
[0,1]. Decisions are taken by weighted majority.
Party i has utility function ui = xi +1−β|θ −θ∗
i|,w h e r exi denotes the
share of private beneﬁts accruing to i,θ is the policy implemented and θ∗
i is
party i’s ideal policy.
Bargaining proceeds as follows: First, the Head of State chooses a party
i. Second, i chooses an order of play ρ : N → {1,2,...,n} so that i is the
ﬁrst one in the order, i.e. ρ(i)=1 . Third, each party j demands a pair
(dj,θj) following the order of play, where dj ∈ [0,1] i st h es h a r eo ft h ep r i v a t e
beneﬁt j claims and θj ∈ [0,1] is a policy. If, after party j makes its demand,
there exists a winning coalition S ⊂ {k : ρ(k) ≤ ρ(j)} such that dS ≤ 1 and
θk = θl for every k,l ∈ S,t h e nj has the additional choice of forming S,i n
which case the policy is implemented and the demands of parties in S are
granted. In case of more than one possible coalition, party j decides which
one is formed. If all parties have moved and no winning coalition has been
formed, the Head of State chooses a ﬁrst mover again. If after T rounds
no agreement is reached, no private beneﬁts are distributed and the policy
5outcome is the one preferred by the median voter.
Example 1 (cf. theorem 1 in Bennett and van Damme 1991 and Morelli
1999) There are three parties, with 1 vote each. The quota is 2. Parties do
not care about policy, that is, ui = xi.L e t T =1 . I nt h eu n i q u es u b g a m e
perfect equilibrium parties 1 and 2 form a coalition and get 1
2 each.
Proof. Since the parties are symmetric the identity of the party chosen by
the Head of State is irrelevant, and the order of moves this party chooses is
irrelevant as well. Without loss of generality suppose party 1 is chosen to
move ﬁrst, and it chooses party 2 to move second.
Proceeding by backwards induction, suppose it is party 3’s turn to move.
If min(d1,d 2) < 1,p a r t y3 will form a coalition with the party with the lowest
demand; if d1 = d2, party 3 is indiﬀerent between 1 and 2 and any choice is
part of an equilibrium at this subgame.
Now consider the situation faced by party 2 after observing d1.I f 2
decides to formulate a demand and let the game go on, setting d2 >d 1 leads
to a payoﬀ of 0; setting d2 <d 1 leads to d2. The payoﬀ of setting d2 = d1
depends on party 3’s tie-breaking rule. As we will see below, party 3 must
b r e a kt i e si nf a v o ro f2 in order for 2 to have a best response at all subgames.
Party 2 then compares the payoﬀ of forming a coalition with party 1
(1−d1)a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ of matching party 1’s demand and inducing a coalition
with party 3 (d1). Party 2 sets θ2 = θ1 and forms a coalition if 1 − d1 >d 1
(i.e. if d1 < 1
2), and makes a demand if d1 > 1
2.I f 3 would break ties in
favor of 1, 2 would not have a best response after observing d1 > 1
2:i tw o u l d
want to set a demand as close as possible to d1, but not d1.
Party 1 obtains d1 if it sets d1 < 1
2 and 0 if d1 > 1
2. Again, 1 does not
have a best response unless 2 breaks ties in its favor for d1 = 1
2.P a r t y1 is
then chooses d1 = 1
2 and an arbitrary value of θ1.
The example illustrates an important property of this type of bargaining
procedure: parties will typically face choices among which they (but not
others) are indiﬀerent, and they must break ties in a particular way in order
6for other parties to have a best response earlier on. We will use this property
repeatedly in the rest of the paper.
Proposition 2 in Morelli (1999) states that, when parties only care about
private beneﬁts and there exists a unique equivalent homogeneous represen-
tation (ω,q), then there is a unique equilibrium payoﬀ distribution, where a
winning coalition S∗ (ρ) is formed and each party i ∈ S∗ (ρ) receives a payoﬀ
ωi
q proportional to its number of votes in the homogeneous representation.
This is indeed the case for some games including symmetric and apex
games, but not in general as the following counterexample illustrates.
Proposition 1 There are ﬁve parties, with 3,2,2,1 and 1 votes respectively.
The quota is 5. This is a game with a unique homogeneous representation.
Let T =1 . The party chosen as the ﬁrst mover can always ﬁnd an order of
play that allows it to get the whole surplus.
Proof. See appendix A.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If party 1 (3 votes) is chosen
to be proposer, it can choose the order [14523], associated to votes [31122],
and get all the surplus. To see this, suppose party 1 demands the whole
surplus. Party 4 (with 1 vote) can either go along with party 1 and demand
0, or make a positive demand and try to form an alternative coalition with
parties 2 and 3. However, given the order of moves, any positive demand
can be undercut by party 5 a n dw i l lr e s u l ti nc o a l i t i o n{2,3,5}.T h u s ,p a r t y
4 may as well demand 0 after observing a demand of 1 by party 1 (indeed,
it must demand 0 in order for party 1 to have a best response). Given that
party 4 demands 0,p a r t y5 is helpless as well: a positive demand would
result in parties 2 and 3 forming a coalition with 4.
If party 2 (2 votes) is chosen to be proposer, it can choose the order
[23451],a s s o c i a t e dt ov o t e s[22113], and get all the surplus. Suppose the
ﬁrst mover demands the whole surplus. This prevents the second mover
from getting a positive payoﬀ in any coalition that includes the ﬁrst mover.
The only other alternative, a coalition with the last mover, would always be
7sabotaged by the two small parties. Thus, the second mover may as well
demand 0 after observing a demand of 1 by the ﬁrst mover. But this in turn
prevents party 4 from getting a positive payoﬀ in a coalition with party 1:
party 1 will always prefer to form a coalition with party 3.T h u s ,p a r t y 4
may as well form a coalition and get 0.
If party 4 (1 vote) is chosen to be proposer, it can choose the order
[42315], associated to votes [12231], and get all the surplus. Suppose party
4 demands the whole surplus. Then party 2 may as well demand 0:a n y
positive demand can be undercut by party 3 and would lead to a coalition
of parties 1 and 3. On the other hand, if party 2 demands 0,p a r t y3 cannot
get a positive payoﬀ: a positive demand would result in party 1 forming a
coalition with party 2.
By committing itself to a demand and sequencing the order of moves
of the other parties in a suitable way, the ﬁrst mover exploits the demand
competition between the other parties in its favor. This is the case even
though the ﬁrst mover has no monopoly proposal power and the rules of the
game allow the ﬁrst mover to be excluded from the government.
Morelli’s argument for proportionality was that a higher than propor-
tional demand would trigger the reaction of an alternative minimal winning
coalition that can divide payoﬀs proportionally: any party that deviates can
be replaced without changing the payoﬀ shares for the others (see Morelli
1999 p. 818). Indeed, such a minimal winning coalition always exists, but by
choosing the order of moves the ﬁrst mover can ensure that the members of
the coalition cannot coordinate on forming an alternative government. For
example, in the order [14523], after party 1 demands the whole surplus there
exists one minimal winning coalition that could exclude 1 and divide payoﬀs
proportionally: coalition {2,3,4}. However, the members of this coalition
do not move consecutively and party 4 knows that any attempt to induce
coalition {2,3,4} will be sabotaged by party 5. There is an alternative min-
imal winning coalition, {2,3,5}, whose members move consecutively, but
8they do not move immediately after party 1: any attempt of party 5 to form
{2,3,5} will be forestalled by party 4 setting a suﬃciently low demand.
However, in the next section we restate Morelli’s result as follows: when
the voting game is homogeneous and constant-sum, and the order of moves is
exogenously determined to be by decreasing weight, then there is a unique
equilibrium payoﬀ distribution, where a minimal winning coalition S∗ is
formed and each party i ∈ S∗ receives a payoﬀ ωi
q proportional to its number
of votes in the homogeneous representation.
3 The model
Let [q;(wi)i∈N] be a constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority game.
There is a budget of size 1 to divide. Party i’s utility function is ui = xi,
where xi is i’s share of the budget. Bargaining proceeds as follows. Parties
move in decreasing order of weight. We label the parties in this order, so
that party 1 moves ﬁrst, followed by party 2, etc.
Each party i makes a demand di, following the order of play, where
di ∈ [0,1] is the share of the private beneﬁtp a r t yi claims. If, after party i
makes its demand, there exists a winning coalition S ⊂ {j : j ≤ i} such that
dS ≤ 1,p a r t yi has the additional choice of forming coalition S,i nw h i c h
case the private beneﬁts are distributed according to the demands made. If
there is more than one possible S,p a r t yi decides which one is formed. If
party n forms no coalition, the game ends with each party getting zero.
Given i ∈ N,w ed e n o t ea sPi the set of predecessors of i.N a m e l y :
Pi := {j ∈ N : j<i }.
Since parties only care about private beneﬁt s ,w ew i l la s s u m et h a tt h e y
do not demand a policy outcome. We also assume T =1 ,i . e . ,t h e r ei so n l y
one round of bargaining.5
5Any ﬁnite T would lead to the same equilibrium outcome, regardless of whether parties
discount future payoﬀs.
9As it will become clear from the analysis, dummy players must get 0 in
equilibrium, so for simplicity we assume there are no dummy players. We will
use the homogeneous representation with ωn =1 ; i.e. the weakest party has
exactly 1 vote. Under these circumstances, every party in a constant-sum
homogeneous game has a positive integer number of votes. Furthermore:
Lemma 1 Let [q;(wi)i∈N] be a constant-sum homogeneous game. Then,
ωN =2 q − 1.
Proof. Because n is not a dummy player, there exists S ∈ Ωm (ω) such that
n ∈ S. Homogeneity implies ωS = q. Because S ∈ Ωm(ω), S\{n} must be
losing. Since the game is constant-sum, (N\S)∪{n} ∈ Ω(ω).M o r e o v e r ,b y
deleting the weakest party (i.e. party n) we obtain a losing coalition N\S.
Thus, (N\S)∪{n} ∈ Ωm (ω).S o ,ω(N\S)∪{n} = q and ωN\S = q −1.H e n c e
ωN = ωS + ωN\S = q + q − 1=2 q − 1.
Corollary 1 Let [q;(wi)i∈N] be a constant-sum homogeneous game. Then,
S is maximal losing (i.e. N\S ∈ Ωm (ω))i ﬀ ωS = q − 1.
Proof. Since (N,v) is constant-sum and homogeneous, S is maximal losing
iﬀ N\S ∈ Ωm (ω),w h i c hm e a n sωN\S = q and thus, under Lemma 1,
ωS = ωN − ωN\S =2 q − 1 − q = q − 1.
Lemma 2 Let [q;(wi)i∈N] be a weighted majority game. Then, there is a
party i such that Pi+1 ∈ Ωm (ω).
Proof. Suppose this was not the case. Consider the smallest index i such
that S = {1,...,i} is a winning coalition. There is a minimal winning coali-
tion S0 ⊂ S,a n dS0 is obtained from S by deleting at least one party j<i .
10However this is impossible because by assumption {1,...,i− 1} is a losing
coalition, and, since wj ≥ wi for all j<i , this coalition has at least as many
votes as S0.
Lemma 2 does not hold for arbitrary orders of the parties. For example,
if we take the game [3;2,1,1,1] and order the parties in such a way that
the party with 2 votes is in the third place, no set of parties {1,...,i} is a
minimal winning coalition. If the parties play the game in this order, the
party that moves ﬁr s tc a n n o tg e tap o s i t i v ep a y o ﬀ for any demand, and this
leads to a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria.
Theorem 1 Let [q;(wi)i∈N] be a constant-sum homogeneous game. Suppose
parties play a demand commitment game in decreasing order of weight. Then
in any subgame perfect equilibrium the minimal winning coalition of Lemma
2f o r m sw i t he a c hp a r t yi demanding ωi
q .
Proof. See Appendix B.
The equilibrium strategies are roughly as follows (for a formal description
see Appendix B). Given the demands of the parties that have moved so
far, party i determines two things: the optimal coalition to be (eventually)
formed and the optimal demand to make.
In general, the optimal coalition S will control exactly q votes. This
coalition will generally include some parties that have moved before i,a s
well as some parties moving after i.S i n c eT = S ∩ Pi is a group of parties
that have already formulated a demand, 1 − dT is the beneﬁt from buying
the votes of the parties in T;t h i sb e n e ﬁt will be shared by the parties in
S\T. Buying less votes leads to a higher beneﬁt, but more votes from parties
moving after i will be needed to complete a winning coalition. The coalition
S is chosen such that the average beneﬁtp e rv o t e , 1−dT
q−ωT , is maximized.
The optimal demand for party i will normally be di = ωi
1−dT
q−ωT ,t h a ti s ,
party i will claim a share of the beneﬁt proportional to its number of votes.
Only in some subgames outside the equilibrium path can party i demand
more than a proportional share.
11Below we present a worked out example.
Example 2 There are ﬁve parties, with 3,2,2,1 and 1 votes respectively.
The quota is 5. If the parties play a demand commitment game in decreasing
order there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, in which coalition {1,2}
forms with d1 = 3
5 and d2 = 2
5.
Proof. We proceed by backward induction.
At stage 5,p a r t y5 faces a vector of demands (d1,d 2,d 3,d 4).I th a st h r e e
choices:
a) Form coalition {1,4,5} and get 1 − d1 − d4.
b) Form coalition {2,3,5} and get 1 − d2 − d3.
c) Form no coalition and get 0.
Suppose forming some coalition is optimal. Then party 5 will form coali-
tion {1,4,5} if 1 − d1 − d4 ≥ 1 − d2 − d3,o rd4 ≤ d2 + d3 − d1.T i e s a r e
broken in favor of forming the coalition that includes party 4,t og u a r a n t e e
that party 4 has a best response in the previous stage. Hence the maximum
demand 4 can make and still get into a coalition with 5 is d4 = d2 +d3 −d1.
At stage 4,p a r t y4 faces a vector of demands (d1,d 2,d 3). It can form
coalition {2,3,4} or make a demand that will lead to {1,4,5}.I t f o r m s
{2,3,4} if 1 − d2 − d3 ≥ d2 + d3 − d1,o r




Thus, party 4 is eﬀectively comparing the average beneﬁt associated to
buying the votes of 2 and 3 (in which case 1 vote is enough to complete
a winning coalition) or the votes of 1 (in which case 2 votes are needed to
complete a winning coalition and 4 must share the beneﬁtw i t h5).
From the inequality above, the maximum demand party 3 can make at
the previous stage and still induce {2,3,4} is
d3 =
1 − 2d2 + d1
2
.
12At stage 3,p a r t y3 faces a vector of demands (d1,d 2).I t c a n f o r m
coalition {1,3} or make a demand that will induce {2,3,4}.I t m a k e s a
demand if 1−2d2+d1







Again, party 3 may buy the votes of party 1 (in which case 2 votes are
required to complete a winning coalition), or the votes of party 2 (in which
case 3 votes are required to complete a winning coalition). It chooses the
alternative with the highest average beneﬁt.
The maximum demand party 2 can make in the previous stage and still





At stage 2,p a r t y2 compares 1−d1 and 3d1−1
2 . It forms {1,2} if 3d1−1
2 ≤
1 − d1,o rd1 ≤ 3




the average beneﬁt of buying no votes).
Anticipating this, party 1 sets d1 = 3
5.P a r t y2 will then set d2 = 2
5 and
coalition {1,2} is formed.
4 Discussion
We have shown that Morelli’s proportionality result still holds if parties must
move in decreasing order of weight. But if parties move in decreasing order
of weight, the coalition that forms is the minimal winning coalition with the
smallest number of parties, as hypothesized by Leiserson (1968, p. 775). If
parties are asymmetric, the smaller parties are never part of the government.
One may ask whether the Head of State can achieve proportional payoﬀs
for an arbitrary minimal winning coalition by choosing the order of moves
appropriately. The answer is negative: for the game [5;3,2,2,1,1],t h e r e
is no order of moves for which coalition {1,4,5} forms with a proportional
13payoﬀ division. There are three types of possible orders for which the parties
in this coalition move ﬁrst: [31122], [13122] and [11322].I t c a n b e s h o w n
that the ﬁrst mover gets the whole budget in order [31122],w h e r e a si nt h e
other two orders the ﬁrst mover gets half of the budget.
If the game is not constant-sum and homogeneous, proportionality may
break down. In some cases, this is due to the presence of a party that can
be ”held hostage” by others, as pointed by Morelli (1999).
Example 3 There are four parties, with 3,2,2 and 1 votes respectively. The
quota is 5. If the parties play a demand commitment game in decreasing
order the unique subgame perfect equilibrium results in coalition {1,2} with
d1 = 1
2 and d2 = 1
2.
Party 4 is helpless because there is only one minimal winning coalition it
can form. Knowing this, party 3 will either form a coalition with 1 and get
1−d1,o rs e td3 =1−d2.P a r t y2 can then form a coalition with 1 (obtaining
1−d1)o rs e td2 = d1 and induce coalition {2,3,4}. Anticipating this, party 1
sets d1 = 1
2. The game [5;3,2,2,1] has many homogeneous representations,
but in none of them do parties 1 and 2 have the same number of votes.
Proportionality can break down even if no party can be held hostage by
others, as the following example illustrates.
Example 4 Consider the game [7;4,3,2,2,1,1]. If the parties play a de-
mand commitment game in decreasing order, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium results in coalition {1,2} with d1 = d2 = 1
2.
The game above is constant-sum but not homogeneous. None of the
parties can be held hostage in the sense of Morelli: given any two parties,
each of them can form a minimal winning coalition that does not include
the other. Moreover, coalition {1,2} has exactly 7 votes. Nevertheless,
proportionality fails because {1,3,4} and {2,3,4} are both minimal winning
coalitions. From the point of view of parties 3 and 4,p a r t i e s1 and 2 are
14equally valuable even though they have a diﬀerent number of votes. If
the turn reaches party 3, which of the two coalitions forms will depend on
whether d1 is higher or lower than d2. Anticipating this, party 2 has two
options: it can form a coalition with 1 and get 1 − d1,o rs e td2 = d1 and
induce coalition {2,3,4}.P a r t y 2 will form a coalition if 1 − d1 ≥ d1,o r
d1 ≥ 1
2.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented a demand bargaining model that makes sharp predictions
regarding coalition formation and payoﬀ division. As in the original model
of Morelli, we need no controversial reﬁnements of subgame perfect equilib-
rium. The model can be extended to any ﬁnite horizon, and its predictions
are independent of the discount factors and the risk attitudes of the parties.
Moreover, the ﬁrst mover has no disproportionate advantage. Because only
the homogeneous representation matters, Gamson’s predictions (see Gam-
son, 1961) hold only approximately, unless the actual seat shares coincide
with the homogeneous weights.
From a normative point of view, proportional payoﬀs are intuitive in the
absence of policy preferences. They are also predicted by many solution con-
cepts like von Neumann-Morgenstern’s (1944) main simple solution, the set
of balanced aspirations (Cross, 1967), the competitive solution (McKelvey
et al., 1978) and the demand bargaining set (Morelli and Montero, 2003).
The empirical evidence is consistent with the proportional payoﬀ prediction,
at least for parties other than the formateur (see Ansolabehere et al. (2005)
and the references therein). We have shown that Morelli’s appealing results
regarding proportionality in demand bargaining do not hold generally. How-
ever, one should keep in mind that they hold for some important types of
games, including symmetric and apex games.
156 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We will denote min(a,b) by a ∧ b and max(a,b) by a ∨ b. There are three
types of parties that can be chosen to be ﬁrst mover: the party with 3 votes,
one of the parties with 2 votes, and one of the parties with 1 vote. We will
examine each case in turn. Given the order chosen by the ﬁrst mover, we
divide the game in stages (each stage corresponding to one party moving)
and construct an equilibrium starting by the last party to move. We then
show that there is no other equilibrium.
CASE 1: Party 1 (3 votes) is the ﬁrst mover. It can choose the
order [14523], associated to votes [31122], and get the whole surplus.
Stage 5. Party 3 (2 votes) faces a vector of demands (d1,d 2,d 4,d 5) and
a vector of policies (θ1,θ2,θ4,θ5). It has four choices6:
a) Form coalition {1,3} and get 1 − d1.
b) If θ2 = θ4,i tc a na l s of o r m{2,3,4} and get 1 − d2 − d4.
c) If θ2 = θ5, it can also form {2,3,5} and get 1 − d2 − d5.
d) Form no coalition and get 0.
Parties 4 and 5 are interchangeable and no minimal winning coalition
includes {3,4,5},s o3 will either include the cheapest of the two parties
in the coalition or none of them. Denote this party by m (formally, m ∈
argmin
i∈{4,5}
di). Suppose θ2 = θm and forming a coalition is optimal. Then 3
will form {1,3} if 1 − d1 > 1 − d2 − dm,a n d{2,3,m} in the reverse case.
Ties are solved in favor of a coalition with 2, and, if d4 = d5,o f{2,3,5}.
Stage 4. Party 2 has two options: to form coalition {1,2},o rt os e t
θ2 = θm and make a demand that will induce party 3 to form {2,3,m}.T h e
maximum demand 2 can make and still induce {2,3,m} is d2 = d1 − dm.I f
d1 −dm ≥ 1−d1,p a r t y2 sets θ2 = θm and makes this demand; otherwise it
6In fact, it may have more choices (e.g. forming coalition {2,3,4,5}) but all of them
are dominated by at least one of these four. Without loss of generality we will not consider
dominated choices. We will also exclude some situations that do not arise in equilibrium
(e.g. demands so high that all coalitions are unfeasible).
16sets θ2 = θ1 and forms {1,2}. Ties are solved in favor of inducing {2,3,m},
and, if d4 = d5, of inducing {2,3,5}.
If party 5 wants to induce {2,3,5} it must set d5 ≤ d4,s ot h a tm =5 .
If d1 − d4 ≥ 1 − d1 setting d5 = d4 will do; otherwise d5 =2 d1 − 1.T h u s ,
the maximum d5 that induces {2,3,5} is d5 = d4 ∧ (2d1 − 1).N o t et h a t ,i f
d1 < 1
2,p a r t y5 cannot induce {2,3,5}: 2 will form {1,2} for any d5 ≥ 0.
Stage 3. Party 5 faces (d1, d4) and (θ1,θ4).I fθ1 = θ4,p a r t y5 compares
1−d1 −d4 and d4 ∧(2d1 −1).T h e np a r t y5 forms {1,4,5} if 1−d1 −d4 ≥
d4 ∧ (2d1 − 1).I fθ4 6= θ1, the only possible coalition for party 5 is {2,3,5},
or no coalition if {2,3,5} cannot be induced by any d5 ≥ 0.I ne i t h e rc a s e
party 4 is excluded, so there is no reason for 4 to set θ4 6= θ1.
T h em a x i m u mv a l u eo fd4 that still induces {1,4,5} depends on the size
of d1. For a relatively large d1 (d1 ≥ 3
5) the critical value is d4 = 1−d1
2 .
Stage 2. The only alternative for party 4 is to induce coalition {1,4,5}.
If 3
5 <d 1 < 1,p a r t y4’s best response is to set θ4 = θ1 and d4 = 1−d1
2 ;a
higher demand would result in party 5 inducing coalition {2,3,5}.I fd1 =1
any demand is optimal, and ties are solved in favor of θ4 = θ1 and d4 = 1−d1
2 .
Stage 1. Party 1 sets d1 =1together with an arbitrary θ1.
We now show the uniqueness of equilibrium payoﬀs. Essentially we will
show that ties must be solved in favor of coalition {1,4,5} when d1 =1
in order for an equilibrium to exist. It is enough to show that d1 =1−  
must lead to coalition {1,4,5} for any small  >0 in a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Having established this, it follows that parties 4 and 5 must
solve ties in favor of party 1 if d1 =1 ; otherwise party 1 would have no best
response.
Let d1 =1− .I fp a r t y4 sets d4 < 1−d1
2 ,p a r t y5’s unique best response
is to form coalition {1,4,5} regardless of the tie-breaking rules used by 2
and 3.I tf o l l o w st h a t5 must form {1,4,5} for d4 = 1−d1
2 as well: otherwise
4 would not have a best response after observing d1 =1−  .
Since {1,4,5} must form for d1 =1−  ,i tm u s ta l s of o r mf o rd1 =1 .
17Notice that in this case any value of d4 is optimal regardless of 5’s tie-
breaking rule; however, 4 and 5 must solve ties in favor of 1.
CASE 2: Party 2 (2 votes) is the ﬁrst mover. It can choose the
order [23451], associated to votes [22113], and get all the surplus.
Stage 5. Party 1 (3 votes) faces a vector of demands (d2,d 3,d 4,d 5) and
a vector of policies (θ2,θ3,θ4,θ5). It has four choices:
a) Form coalition {1,2} and get 1 − d2.
b) Form coalition {1,3} and get 1 − d3.
c) If θ4 = θ5, it can also form {1,4,5} and get 1 − d4 − d5.
d) Form no coalition and get 0.
Suppose θ4 = θ5 and forming some coalition is optimal. Then party 1
forms {1,4,5} if 1 − d4 − d5 ≥ 1 − (d2 ∧ d3). Thus, the maximum demand
party 5 can make and still induce coalition {1,4,5} is d5 =( d2 ∧ d3) − d4.
Stage 4. If θ2 = θ3,p a r t y5 can form {2,3,5} and get 1 − d2 − d3.
Alternatively, it can induce {1,4,5} by setting θ5 = θ4 and d5 =( d2∧d3)−d4.
It will do so if (d2 ∧ d3) − d4 ≥ 1 − d2 − d3,o rd4 ≤ d2 + d3 +( d2 ∧ d3) − 1.
Stage 3. Party 4 can induce coalition {1,4,5} by setting d4 = d2+d3+
(d2∧d3)−1.I fθ2 = θ3, it can also form coalition {2,3,4}.I tf o r m s{2,3,4}
if 1 − d2 − d3 ≥ d2 + d3 +( d2 ∧ d3) − 1.
Stage 2. If d2 ≥ 2
5,p a r t y3 can induce coalition {2,3,4} by setting
θ3 = θ2 and d3 = 2−2d2
3 . A larger demand or/and setting θ3 6= θ2 would
result in party 4 inducing {1,4,5}.
Stage 1. Party 2 sets d2 =1together with an arbitrary value of θ2.
To see that equilibrium payoﬀs are unique, let d2 =1− .I fd3 < 2−2d2
3 ,
party 4 strictly prefers to form {2,3,4}.I n o r d e r f o r 3 to have a best
response, 4 must solve ties in favor of {2,3,4} for d3 = 2−2d2
3 .B u t t h e n
both 3 and 4 must solve ties in favor of party 2 for d2 =1 .
CASE 3: Party 4 (1 vote) is the ﬁrst mover. It can choose the
order [42315], associated to votes [12231], and get all the surplus.
Stage 5.I f θ1 = θ4,p a r t y5 can form {1,4,5} and get 1 − d1 − d4.
18If θ2 = θ3,i tc a nf o r m{2,3,5} and get 1 − d2 − d3. It can also form no
coalition and get 0.
Suppose θ1 = θ4 and θ2 = θ3.P a r t y 5 forms {1,4,5} if 1 − d1 − d4 ≥
(1−d2 −d3)∨0.I fθ2 6= θ3, the relevant condition is 1−d1 −d4 ≥ 0.T h u s
the critical value of d1 is (weakly) higher if θ2 6= θ3: because party 5 cannot
form {2,3,5},p a r t y1 can get a better deal in coalition {1,4,5}.
Stage 4. Party 1 can form the cheapest of coalitions {1,2} and {1,3}
and get 1 − (d2 ∧ d3), or induce {1,4,5} by setting θ1 = θ4 and d1 =1− d4
(if d2 +d3 > 1 or θ2 6= θ3)o rd1 = d2 +d3 −d4 (if d2 +d3 ≤ 1 and θ2 = θ3).
Thus for θ2 = θ3,p a r t y1 forms a two-party coalition if 1 − (d2 ∧ d3) ≥
(d2 + d3 − d4) ∧ (1 − d4).
Stage 3.P a r t y3 can form {2,3,4} (provided θ2 = θ4) or induce {1,3}.
In order to induce {1,3},p a r t y3 must set d3 ≤ d2, and can do no better
than setting θ2 = θ3. What is the highest value of d3 that still induces
coalition {1,3}?I fd4 > 1
2 there are two possible cases:
If d2 ≤ 1
2, d3 = d2 will induce {1,3}.I f p a r t y 3 sets d3 = d2,w eh a v e
d3 +d2 ≤ 1, thus the relevant inequality for party 1 is 1−d2 ≥ 2d2 −d4,o r
d2 ≤ 1+d4
3 .T h i si ss a t i s ﬁed for d4 > 1
2.S i n c ep a r t y3 can induce {1,3} by
setting d3 = d2,p a r t y3 will form {2,3,4} if 1−d2 −d4 ≥ d2,o rd2 ≤ 1−d4
2 .
If d2 > 1
2, {2,3,4} leads to a negative payoﬀ.T h u s , p a r t y 3 always
induces {1,3}.T h i si sa c h i e v e db ys e t t i n gd3 = d2 ∧ d4.
Stage 2. If 1
2 <d 4 ≤ 1, it is a best response for party 2 to set θ2 = θ4
(setting θ2 6= θ4 would result in coalition {1,3})a n dd2 = 1−d4
2 .
Stage 1. Party 4 sets d4 =1and an arbitrary θ4.
Uniqueness can be established analogously to the previous cases.
7 Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
The result trivially follows if there is a veto player. In constant-sum games,
av e t op l a y e rm u s tb ead i c t a t o r ,t h u sω1 = q,a n dd1 =1would be the
equilibrium outcome. We will assume from now on that ωi <qfor all i.
19We denote as B(d,i) with i ∈ N and d ∈ RPi the subgame which begins
when it is party i’s turn, facing a vector d of demands. At subgame B(d,i),
party i will determine the optimal winning coalition S 3 i to be formed,
and will formulate a demand di that will lead to S being formed. We will
show how party i determines which coalition is optimal as well as how the
optimal coalition can be induced by the choice of di.
Suppose we are in B(d,i), and party i plans to make a demand in the
belief that a coalition S ∈ Ω(ω) with i ∈ S will be formed. This coalition
should include some parties from N\Pi (party i and possibly parties that
move after it) and may also include some predecessors from Pi.L e tα be the
number of votes controlled by parties in S ∩ (N\Pi). Then, the parties in
S∩Pi should control at least q−α votes. We denote as b(i,α) the maximum
beneﬁt that can be achieved by buying these q −α votes from parties in Pi.
b(i,α): =m a x{1 − dT : T ⊂ Pi,ωT ≥ q − α}.
Party i can calculate b(i,α) for every feasible value of α.N o t i c et h a tn o t
all integers between 0 and q a r ef e a s i b l ef o re v e r yp l a y e r .F i r s t ,α cannot be
so small that even the votes of all the parties in Pi would not suﬃce. Let
γi
0 := q − ωPi.
In order for b(i,α) to exist we need α ≥ γi
0.
Since party i must be in S, it seems reasonable to require α ≥ ωi as well.
The next lemma shows that this is unnecessary: there is no positive beneﬁt
from buying more than q − ωi votes.
Lemma 3 Let γi
0 ≤ α<ω i and assume no party j<ihas made a strictly
dominated choice of dj.T h e n ,b(i,α) ≤ 0.M o r e o v e r ,b(i,α)=0implies
b(i,ωi) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let T ⊂ Pi such that ωT ≥ q − α.S i n c eα<ω i,w eh a v e
ωT∪{i} = ωT + ωi >ω T + α ≥ q.
20Hence, since the game is homogeneous, T ∪ {i} cannot be a minimal
winning coalition. Moreover, party i is the party with less votes in T ∪ {i},
thus coalition T should be winning. This means that either dT ≥ 1 (implying
b(i,α) ≤ 0)o rdT < 1, in which case the smallest party in T (party j)
would have been strictly better-oﬀ by setting a higher demand and forming
a coalition, regardless of the actions of the parties moving after j.
Moreover, when b(i,α)=0 , b(i,ωi) ≥ 0 follows from the fact that b(i,·)
is nondecreasing in the second variable.
We will eliminate strictly dominated strategies, thus in all the subgames
we study it will be the case that b(i,α) ≤ 0 for γi
0 ≤ α<ω i. Otherwise the
turn would never have reached party i.
Since there is no positive beneﬁt from buying more than q − ωi votes,
and (given that there is no beneﬁtl e f tt ob ed i v i d e d )t h ep a r t i c u l a rv a l u e
of α is irrelevant if b(i,α)=0 , any lower bound between 0 and ωi can be







Moreover, party i is constrained by the number of votes owned by parties
in N\Pi.T h u s ,α must be smaller or equal to
δi := ωN\Pi.
Notice that δi+1 = δi − ωi for all i<n .A l s o ,ωi <qimplies γi
0 ≤ δi+1.
It follows from lemma 4.9 in Ostmann (1987) that ωi ≤ δi+1 for all i<n ,
thus γi ≤ δi+1 for all i<n .
For party 1 only α ≥ q is feasible and b(1,α)=1for all α ≥ q.F o r
party n,o n l yα =1is feasible and b(n,1) is simply n’s payoﬀ from buying
the votes of one of the cheapest coalitions controlling at least q − 1 votes.
The following lemma shows how b(i +1 ,α) is determined from b(i,·) and
di.I tm a yb et h ec a s et h a t ,h a v i n gα votes in its pocket, party i+1cannot
7Al o w e rb o u n do f1 has the advantage of being independent of i and allowing division
by all values of α, but the proof can be adapted to any other choice.
21form a winning coalition without party i.T h e nb(i +1 ,α)=b(i,α + ωi)−di
irrespective of di.O t h e r w i s ep a r t yi+1will compare the best coalition that
includes i with the best coalition that does not include i. Given that i is
included in the coalition, i+1 needs to buy the remaining votes (q−(α + ωi))
from Pi, and the best way to do this leads to a beneﬁto fb(i,α + ωi);
after paying di, there would be b(i,α + ωi) − di left. Without party i,
the maximum beneﬁt from buying q − α votes without buying i’s votes is
precisely b(i,α).P a r t yi will then be included if di is suﬃciently low.
Whether di is suﬃciently low depends on the demands of the parties in
Pi. Because parties may be complements, in some cases no positive demand
by i would be low enough, as the following example illustrates.
Consider the game [10;7,3,3,3,1,1,1].L e t i =3 , i +1=4 .W e h a v e
b(3,7) = max(1 − d1,1 − d2) and b(3,4) = 1 − d1.H a v i n g 7 votes in its
pocket, party 3 may buy the votes of either party 1 (with a beneﬁto f1−d1)
or party 2 (with a beneﬁto f1−d2). On the other hand, having only 4 votes,
party 3 must buy the votes of party 1,w i t hab e n e ﬁto f1 − d1.
If party 4 wants to compute b(4,4) it compares 1−d1 and 1−d2−d3.T h u s
in this particular case parties 2 and 3 are complements. If d3 is high, then
b(4,4) = 1−d1, which is precisely b(3,4). If both d3 and d2 are suﬃciently low,
then b(4,4) = 1−d2−d3 and b(3,7) = 1−d2,h e n c eb(4,4) = b(3,4+ω3)−d3.
If d2 >d 1, no positive value of d3 is suﬃciently low.
Lemma 4 Assume we are in B(d,i +1 ) .L e tα such that γi+1
0 ≤ α ≤ δi+1.
Then γi
0 ≤ α + ωi ≤ δi and furthermore:
a) if α<γ i
0,t h e nb(i +1 ,α)=b(i,α + ωi) − di;
b) if α ≥ γi
0,t h e nb(i,α) exists and
b(i +1 ,α)=m a x{b(i,α),b(i,α + ωi) − di}.
Proof. We have to prove that γi
0 ≤ α + ωi ≤ δi. It is straightforward:
α ≤ δi+1 =⇒ α + ωi ≤ δi+1 + ωi = δi.
22α ≥ γi+1
0 = q − ωPi+1 =⇒ α + ωi ≥ q − ωPi+1 + ωi = q − ωPi = γi
0.
a) If α<γ i
0,e v e r yT ⊂ Pi+1 with ωT ≥ q − α satisﬁes i ∈ T. Then:
b(i +1 ,α)= m a x
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−α





(1 − dT) − di = b(i,α + ωi) − di.
b) If α ≥ γi
0, b(i,α) is well deﬁned and















(1 − dT), max
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−α−ωi
(1 − dT) − di
¾
=m a x {b(i,α),b(i,α + ωi) − di}.
We have deﬁned the best way to form a coalition that contains α votes
from N\Pi and at least q−α votes from Pi. It remains to choose the optimal
value of α, and the optimal demand di.
We denote as Σi the set of values between γi and δi that maximize









≥ 0 for some/all8 σi ∈ Σi.








/σi is maximum, we deduce that b(i,α) < 0 for every
α ≥ γi. The same occurs for α =0since b(i,α) is nondecreasing in α.T h i s
means that no winning coalition can be formed.
8Of course, b(i,σ) ≥ 0 for some σ ∈ Σ





< 0 for some/all σi ∈ Σi,p a r t yi formulates an arbitrary
demand and the game eventually ends with no coalition being formed.
From now on, we will assume that b
¡
i,σi¢
≥ 0 for all σi ∈ Σi.W ew i l l
show that in equilibrium party i always chooses some α ∈ Σi.
The following lemma shows that all values of α between δi+1 +1and
δi+1 + ωi = δi lead to the same b(i,α). The extra votes are not valuable
because they are not enough to replace any party from Pi.
For example, in the game [10;7,3,3,3,1,1,1], δ4 =6and δ5 =3 .C o n -
sider the situation of party 4.I fi tt a k e sα =4 , there are two ways to form a
winning coalition: buying the votes of party 1, or buying the votes of parties
2 and 3.T h u s ,b(4,4) = max(1−d1,1−d2−d3). If instead it takes α =5or
α =6 , exactly the same parties are needed: none of party 4’s predecessors
can be dispensed with despite the extra votes.
Lemma 6 Assume we are in the subgame B(d,i).T h e n
©






T ⊂ Pi : ωT ≥ q − δiª
for all α =1 ,2,...,ωi.




.T h e n
ωT ≥ q −
¡
ωN\Pi − ωi + α
¢
= q − ωN\Pi +( ωi − α) ≥ q − ωN\Pi.
“⊃”L e tT ⊂ Pi such that ωT ≥ q−ωN\Pi. Then, T ∪(N\Pi) is winning
and contains party i. We study two cases:
• T ∪ (N\Pi)\{i} = T ∪ (N\Pi+1) is also winning. Then, ωT ≥ q −
ωN\Pi+1 and the result is proved.
• T ∪ (N\Pi+1) is losing. Then, since the game is constant-sum, we
conclude that its complement, (N\T) ∩ Pi+1, is winning and contains
party i as the weakest member. By taking out party i,w eo b t a i n
the coalition (N\T)∩Pi which is losing (since its complementary T ∪
24(N\Pi) is winning). Thus, (N\T) ∩ Pi+1 is minimal winning and T ∪
(N\Pi+1) is maximal losing. Hence, under Corollary 1:
ωT = q − ωN\Pi+1 − 1 ≥ q − ωN\Pi+1 − α.







for all α =1 ,2,...,ωi.




σi >δ i+1 =⇒ σi = δi+1 +1 .

































σi ∈ Σi such that σi >δ i+1.S i n c eσi = δi+1 + α for some α =1 ,2,...,ωi,
we conclude the result.
Now we deﬁne the maximum demand party i can make at B(d,i).T h i s
depends on what party i +1can achieve without party i.I f p a r t y i +1
decides to exclude party i, it is in a similar situation to party i except that
it has less feasible values for α.I t w i l l b e c h o o s i n g a n α between γi and
δi+1, and the maximum beneﬁt from buying q − α votes without party i is
precisely b(i,α).W ed e ﬁne Ti as the set of values between γi and δi+1 that










































It is easy to prove that d∗
i is independent of the particular choice of σi and








≥ 0 for some τi ∈ Ti if and only if b
¡
i,τi¢




=0for some σi,t h e nb
¡
i,σi¢
=0for all σi and b
¡
i,τi¢
≤ 0 for all
τi ∈ Ti.T h u s ,d∗





i is the same for all σi ≤ δi+1.I fσi >δ i+1, σi = δi+1 +1 .I fΣi contains
some σi ≤ δi+1 as well as σi = δi+1 +1 , d∗
i will still be independent of the





In order to prove that d∗
i is the equilibrium demand of party i,t h e
following lemmas will be useful. Notice that σi >ω i for some σi ∈ Σi
implies i<n , because ωn =1and γn = δn =1 .
Lemma 7 Assume we are in B(d,i).I fσi >ω i for some σi ∈ Σi and party
i demands di ≤ d∗
i,t h e n
γi+1 ≤ σi − ωi ≤ δi+1 (2)
b
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and, given any τi ∈ Ti,
b
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σi if σi ≤ δi+1
b(i,τi)












Furthermore, inequality in (4) is strict iﬀ di <d ∗
i.
Proof. Let σi ∈ Σi such that σi >ω i.W eﬁrst prove (2):
σi ≤ δi =⇒ σi − ωi ≤ δi − ωi = δi+1.
σi ≥ γi ≥ γi
0 = q − ωPi =⇒ σi − ωi ≥ q − ωPi − ωi = q − ωPi+1 = γi+1
0 .
σi >ω i =⇒ σi − ωi > 0= ⇒ σi − ωi ≥ 1.
26We have just proven that σi − ωi is a feasible value of α for party i +1 .
Notice that for b
¡
i,σi¢
> 0, homogeneity implies σi − ωi ≥ ωi+1.
We prove now (3) and (4). Under Lemma 4a) ,( 3 )i st r u ew h e nσi−ωi <
γi





then using di ≤ d∗
i.9 Assume then σi − ωi ≥ γi
0.W eh a v et w oc a s e s :
1. If σi ≤ δi+1,t h e nd∗
i =
ωib(i,σi)






























Hence, (3) follows under lemma 4b). Moreover
b
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with strict inequality iﬀ di <d ∗
i.











































Hence, (3) follows under lemma 4b).
To show (4), we distinguish two subcases:
9Actually, σ


































































with strict inequality iﬀ di <d ∗
i.
Lemma 8 Assume we are in B(d,i +1 )and σi >ω i for some σi ∈ Σi.
a) If di <d ∗
i,t h e ni ∈ S for all S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT) and all
σi+1 ∈ Σi+1.
b) If di = d∗
i,t h e nσi − ωi ∈ Σi+1.M o r e o v e r ,S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−σi
(1 − dT)
implies S ∪ {i} ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−(σi−ωi)
(1 − dT).
c) If di = d∗
i,g i v e nσi+1 ∈ Σi+1 and S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT),
i ∈ S implies S ∩ Pi ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−σi
(1 − dT) for some σi ∈ Σi.
Proof. a) Let σi+1 ∈ Σi+1. Suppose there exists S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT)






.W es e et h r e ec a s e s :

















i +1 ,σi − ωi
¢
σi − ωi
which contradicts that σi+1 ∈ Σi+1.

















i +1 ,σi − ωi
¢
σi − ωi
which contradicts that σi+1 ∈ Σi+1.
b) Let α such that γi+1 ≤ α ≤ δi+1. Under Lemma 4, either b(i +1 ,α)=










If b(i +1 ,α)=b(i,α), we proceed like in case a).
If b(i +1 ,α)=b(i,α + ωi) − di,w eh a v et h r e ec a s e s :




b(i,α + ωi) − di
α
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2. If σi >δ i+1 and b
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α + ωi >δ i+1, by Corollary 2).




b(i,α + ωi) − di
α
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b(i,α + ωi) − di
α
=


















> 0, corollary 2 implies σi = δi+1 +1 .T h e nα − ωi >δ i+1




/α ≤ 1.I f b(i,σi)=0 ,





















3. If σi >δ i+1 and b
¡
i,τi¢
< 0 for some/all τi ∈ Ti, then either




α + ωi >δ i+1, by Corollary 2).
































We now prove the second statement. Let S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−σi
(1 − dT).W e
have to prove b
¡
i +1 ,σi − ωi
¢
=1− dS∪{i}.U s i n g( 3 ) ,
b
¡





− di =1− dS − di =1− dS∪{i}.
c) Since i ∈ S, b(i +1 ,σi+1)=b(i,σi+1 + ωi) − di,o r
b(i,σi+1 + ωi)=b(i +1 ,σi+1)+di. (5)
Let σi >ω i.W eh a v es h o w nt h a tσi − ωi ∈ Σi+1,t h u s
b(i +1 ,σi+1)
σi+1 =
b(i +1 ,σi − ωi)
σi − ωi
. (6)









































2. If σi >δ i+1 for all σi ∈ Σi, δi+1 +1always belongs to Σi.
Suppose S ∩ Pi / ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−σi
(1 − dT) for all σi ∈ Σi. Then it must
b et h ec a s et h a tf o ra n yσi either ωS∩Pi <q− σi,o rωS∩Pi ≥ q − σi
but 1 − dS∩Pi is not maximal.
Suppose ωS∩Pi <q− σi for all σi ∈ Σi.S i n c e δi+1 +1∈ Σi,i t
follows from Lemma 6 that ωS∩Pi <q−δi. But then ωS∩Pi +ωN\Pi =
ωS∩Pi+1 + ωN\Pi+1 <q , contradicting the assumption that ωS∩Pi+1 ≥
q − σi+1.
Suppose ωS∩Pi ≥ q − σi but 1 − dS∩Pi < 1 − dT for some σi ∈ Σi and
T ⊂ Pi with ωT ≥ q − σi.
If σi+1 + ωi >δ i+1,
b(i,σi+1 + ωi)
(6)
= b(i,σi) > 1 − dS∩Pi = b(i +1 ,σi+1)+di
contradicting (5).




τi . There are two possibilities.







τi (σi+1 + ωi) ≥ b(i,σi+1 + ωi)
(5)
= b(i +1 ,σi+1)+di =
=
b(i,τi)
τi σi+1 + b
¡
i,σi¢

















σi . Hence σi+1 + ωi ∈ Σi and the result follows.




b(i,σi+1 + ωi)=b(i +1 ,σi+1)+di = b(i,σi).
Hence b(i,σi)=1− dS∩Pi and the result follows.





≥ 0 for some/all τi ∈ Ti,t h e n
i/ ∈ S for all S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1




< 0 for some/all τi ∈ Ti, then every party obtains zero.










− di. This will be due to party i +1
having the option of setting α = σi (if σi ≤ δi+1)o rα = τi (if σi >δ i+1).
We examine each case in turn:
1. If σi ≤ δi+1,t h e ndi >
ωib(i,σi)
σi .
Since σi ≤ δi+1, b(i +1 ,σi) exists. Moreover, lemma 4b)i m p l i e s
b(i +1 ,σi) ≥ b(i,σi). (8)
In principle, there are three possibilities for σi+1:e i t h e rσi+1 <γ i
0,

















− di. We will show that the ﬁrst two

























































− di. We conclude then
that i/ ∈ S for all S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT).





























































− di, which implies i/ ∈ S for all
S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT) as desired.
We have two cases:





















































which is a contradiction.































































which is a contradiction.











.L e tα be such that γi+1 ≤ α ≤ δi+1. Under Lemma 4, we have two
cases:
1. b(i +1 ,α)=b(i,α + ωi) − di.T h e n




Since α + ωi ≤ δi, b(i,α + ωi) ≤ b
¡
i,δi¢
and thus b(i +1 ,α) < 0.
342. b(i +1 ,α)=b(i,α).T h e nγi








and thus b(i +1 ,α) < 0.
Since b(i +1 ,α) < 0 for all α, we conclude b
¡
i +1 ,σi+1¢
< 0 for all
σi+1 ∈ Σi+1 and thus by Lemma 5 all the parties get zero.
Let us consider the following strategy proﬁle for the parties. In B(d,n),
party n forms a coalition S ∪ {n} with S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pn:ωT≥q−ωn
(1 − dT) after
demanding dn =1−dS. If there is more than one possible choice of S,p a r t y
n uses the following tie-breaking rule: First, select only the coalitions that
contain the party with the highest index (party n − 1,o r ,i fp a r t yn − 1 is
in none of the coalitions, party n − 2 etc.). If there are several coalitions
containing this party, select the ones that contain the party with the second
highest index, etc., until only one coalition is left.
Let i<na n da s s u m ew eh a v ed e ﬁned the strategies for parties in
B(d,i +1 ) .I nB(d,i),p a r t yi proceeds as follows:
1. If σi >ω i for all σi ∈ Σi,p a r t yi demands di = d∗
i g i v e na si n( 1 ) .
2. If Σi = {ωi},p a r t yi forms coalition S ∪{i} with S ∈ argmin
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−ωi
dT.
If there is more than one possible choice of S,p a r t yi uses the tie-
breaking rule: Among all the optimal coalitions S ∈ argmin
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−ωi
dT,
party i selects the ones that contain the party with the highest index
(i−1, or, if party i−1 is in none of the coalitions, party i−2, etc). If
there are several coalitions containing this party, select the ones that
contain the party with the second highest index, etc., until only one
coalition is left.
3. If {ωi} Ã Σi,p a r t yi can anticipate the coalition S∗ that will be
formed should it demand d∗
i and its followers play the strategies we
have deﬁned.
35(a) If i/ ∈ S∗,p a r t yi forms coalition S∪{i} with S ∈ argmin
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−ωi
dT.
If there is more than one possible S,p a r t yi uses the tie-breaking
rule.
(b) If i ∈ S∗,p a r t yi compares the coalitions S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−ωi
(1 − dT)
and S∗ ∩ Pi.A m o n g t h e m , p a r t y i selects a coalition following
the tie-breaking rule. If S∗ is chosen, party i demands di = d∗
i
g i v e na si n( 1 ) . I fS 6= S∗ is chosen, then party i demands
1 − dS = b(i,ωi)=d∗
i.and forms coalition S ∪ {i}.
The role of the tie-breaking rule is to ensure that parties have a best
response at all stages (cf. Example 1).
Proposition 2 The above strategies constitute a SPE for any B(d,i).
Proof. We proceed by backwards induction on i.F o ri = n, its strategy is
clearly optimal.
Assume now the result is true for B(d,i +1 )and moreover assume the
following two conditions hold:
Condition 1 The formed coalition satisﬁes
S ∩ Pi+1 ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT)
for some σi+1 ∈ Σi+1. (This condition holds trivially for i +1=n
because Σn = {ωn}).
Condition 2 The above S and σi+1 are such that S ∩ Pi+1 is one of the
most favorable sets for party i (i.e. i/ ∈ S implies i/ ∈ T for all T ∈
argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT) and all σi+1 ∈ Σi+1). Among them, it is one
of the most favorable to party i − 1, etc. (This condition holds for
i +1=n because Σn = {ωn} and n applies the tie-breaking rule).
We check that this remains true for B(d,i).L e tτi ∈ Ti.W eh a v et w o
cases:
361. If σi >ω i for all σi ∈ Σi, then it is straightforward to check that
party i obtains stricly less than d∗
i by forming coalition. If i demands
d∗
i, S ∪ {i} ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT) for σi+1 = σi − ωi ∈ Σi+1.
The induction hypothesis (Conditions 1 and 2) implies that d∗
i will





≥ 0, under Lemma 9a)p a r t yi does not belong to any coalition
in argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT) for any σi+1 ∈ Σi+1 and its ﬁnal payoﬀ




under Lemma 9b), its ﬁnal payoﬀ is zero.
Moreover, Conditions 1 and 2 hold for i. Condition 1 follows from
Lemma 8b) and the induction hypothesis applied to Conditions 1 and
2. Condition 2 follows from the tie-breaking rule applied by the party
j>ithat eventually forms coalition.
2. If ωi ∈ Σi,t h e n1−dS = b(i,ωi)=d∗
i for all S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−ωi
(1 − dT).
This means that if party i forms a winning coalition it obtains a ﬁnal
payoﬀ of b(i,ωi). Suppose party i deviates and demands di >b(i,ωi).
It is enough to check that i/ ∈ S for all S ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT)
and all σi+1 ∈ Σi+1. Under the induction hypothesis applied to Con-
dition 1, this means that party i will not be included in any eventual
winning coalition, and its ﬁnal payoﬀ will be zero, while the original
strategy yields a nonnegative payoﬀ.
For constant-sum homogeneous games it is always the case that ωi ≤
δi+1,t h u sb(i +1 ,ωi) is well deﬁned. Under Lemma 4b),
b(i +1 ,ωi)=m a x{b(i,ωi),b(i,2ωi) − di} ≥ b(i,ωi) (12)
Suppose that i ∈ S for some S ∈ argmin
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1













































which is a contradiction. This contradiction proves that i/ ∈ S for all
S ∈ argmin
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
dT,a sd e s i r e d .
We now check that Conditions 1 and 2 hold for i.I f p a r t y i forms
coalition, Condition 1 holds with σi = ωi, and Condition 2 holds
because of the tie-breaking rule. If party i demands d∗
i so that S∗
is induced, it must be the case that {ωi} Ã Σi. Hence, there exists
σi ∈ Σi with σi >ω i. Then, Condition 1 follows from Lemma 8b)a n d
the induction hypothesis applied to Conditions 1 and 2. Condition 2
follows from the tie-breaking rule applied by the party that eventually
forms coalition.
The next proposition shows uniqueness of equilibrium payoﬀs.E q u i -
librium strategies are not unique for some subgames. In subgames B(d,i)
where no coalition can be formed (i.e., b(i,σi) < 0), any demand vector is
part of a SPE and equilibrium payoﬀsa r ea l w a y s0 for all parties. Multiplic-
ity may also arise in subgames where a coalition can be formed but d∗
i =0 ,
as the following example illustrates.
Example 5 Consider the game [5;3,2,2,1,1] and suppose d1 = d2 =1 .
Equilibrium strategies at B(d,3) are not unique, but equilibrium payoﬀsa r e .
38At B(d,3) we have d∗
3 =0and Σ3 = {2,3}.I fw el o o ka tt h i ss u b g a m e
in isolation, several equilibrium outcomes are possible: coalition {1,3} (as-
sociated to σ3 =2 ), coalition {2,3,4} or {2,3,5} (associated to σ3 =3 ),
coalition {2,3,4,5} (which is not a minimal winning coalition), coalition
{1,4,5} (which does not include party 3), or even no winning coalition at
all. Intuitively, since the parties in {3,4,5} cannot get a positive payoﬀ,
they are indiﬀerent between all these situations. However, parties that have
moved before are not indiﬀerent. If we take into account that the strate-
gies must be part of an equilibrium for all the subgames, and in particular
for subgame B(d,2), some of the equilibrium strategies at B(d,3) are not
equilibrium strategies for B(d,2) and are discarded (cf. example 1). In par-
ticular, a coalition containing party 2 must be formed in order for party 2
to have a best response at B(d,2). Nevertheless, multiplicity remains: after
party 2 sets d2 =1 , there are three possible equilibrium coalitions: {2,3,4},
{2,3,5} and {2,3,4,5}. Nevertheless, all equilibrium strategies lead to the
same payoﬀs.
Proposition 3 Assume we are in a SPE in B(d,i).I f b(i,σi) ≥ 0 for
some/all σi ∈ Σi,p a r t yi’s payoﬀ is d∗
i as deﬁned in (1); otherwise party i’s
payoﬀ is zero.
Proof. We proceed by backwards induction on i.W e p r o v e t h e f o l l o w i n g
three hypotheses:
1. If b(i,σi) < 0, all parties get zero in every SPE of B(d,i).
2. If b(i,σi) > 0,p a r t yi receives d∗
i > 0 in every SPE of B(d,i) and the
coalition that forms satisﬁes S ∩ Pi ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−σi
(1 − dT) for some
σi ∈ Σi.
3. If b(i,σi)=0 ,
a)p a r t yi gets d∗
i =0in every SPE of B(d,i);
39b)t h e r ei saS P Eo fB(d,i) in which a winning coalition forms;
c) if a winning coalition S forms, then S ∩ Pi ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−σi
(1 − dT)
for some σi ∈ Σi.
The induction hypothesis holds for party n. Now suppose it holds for
party i +1 .D o e si th o l df o rp a r t yi?
1. If b(i,σi) < 0, all parties get zero (Lemma 5).
2. If b(i,σi) > 0,p a r t yi cannot get more than d∗
i by forming coalition.
If party i demands more than d∗
i and b(i,τi) ≥ 0,w ek n o wf r o m
Lemma 9a)t h a ti/ ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi+1:ωT≥q−σi+1
(1 − dT) for all σi+1 ∈ Σi+1.
The induction hypothesis implies that party i gets zero. If party i
demands more than d∗
i and b(i,τi) < 0,w ek n o wf r o mL e m m a9 b)
that party i gets zero.
N o ww es h o wt h a tp a r t yi can get at least d∗
i. T h i si si m m e d i a t ei f
ωi ∈ Σi. Suppose ωi / ∈ Σi.S i n c e b(i,σi) > 0,w ek n o wd∗
i > 0.T h e
value of d∗
i+1 induced by d∗
i may be strictly positive or 0. Suppose
party i demands di <d ∗
i. Then the corresponding value of d∗
i+1 is
strictly positive. Under Lemma 8a), party i belongs to all coalitions
associated with some element of Σi+1, and the induction hypothesis
for d∗
i+1 > 0 implies that party i gets di. Thus, the perfectness of the
equilibrium implies that d∗
i is accepted (otherwise, party i would not
have a best response).
Moreover, Lemma 8c), the induction hypothesis and the fact that
d∗
i is accepted imply that the coalition that forms satisﬁes S ∩ Pi ∈
argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−σi
(1 − dT) for some σi ∈ Σi.
3. If b(i,σi)=0 ,t h e nd∗
i =0and, moreover, α ∈ Σi if and only if
b(i,α)=0 .
40a)I ti st r i v i a lt h a tp a r t yi gets d∗
i =0 .I f di >d ∗
i, the induction
hypothesis implies that no coalition to which party i belongs will form.
b) There is an equilibrium of the subgame in which a coalition associ-
ated with σi ∈ Σi forms. This is clearly the case for ωi ∈ Σi.O t h e r -
wise, it is optimal for party i to demand d∗




0 for all σi+1 ∈ Σi+1 and the induction hypothesis implies that there
is a SPE of B(i,d) in which a winning coalition is formed.
c) Assume a winning coalition S is formed with S∩Pi / ∈ argmax
T⊂Pi:ωT≥q−σi
(1 − dT)
for all σi ∈ Σi. This means that, for a given σi ∈ Σi,e i t h e rωS∩Pi ≥
q − σi but 1 − dS∩Pi is not maximal, or ωS∩Pi <q− σi.
Assume ﬁrst there exists σi ∈ Σi such that ωS∩Pi ≥ q−σi but 1−dS∩Pi
is not maximal. Since b
¡
i,σi¢
=0 , this means dS∩Pi > 1 and it cannot
be optimal at any subgame to form S.




b(i,α) is nondecreasing in α, δi ∈ Σi;t h u sωS∩Pi <q−δi. This means
ωS∩Pi + ωS∩(N\Pi) <q .T h u s ,S is not a winning coalition.
Corollary 3 In any SPE, the coalition of Lemma 2 forms with each party
demanding di = ωi
q .
Proof. Denote this coalition by S∗. Because of lemma 2, S∗ = Pl+1 for
some value of l.W ec a ns h o wdi = ωi
q for i =1 ,...,lby induction on i.
Party 1 ﬁnds Σ1 = {q} and, since q ≤ δ2 (due to the absence of veto
players and the game being constant-sum) sets a demand d∗
1 = w1
q . Given
this demand, q − ω1 ∈ Σ2.
Assume now dj =
ωj
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